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Abstract 
‘Blue’ or Eurobonds guaranteed via joint and several liability by the eurozone member states have been 
proposed by Bruegel, the Brussels-based think tank, as a key tool to stabilise and structure the eurozone 
sovereign bond markets. However, as current events show, a second key feature of the proposal – their 
limitation in volume to 60% of GDP – will be untenable in times of financial crisis. It carries the risk of 
exploding marginal costs of funds to those sovereigns facing rapidly rising debt levels and forcing them 
to issue ‘red’ bonds on their own standing. Rapidly rising fund costs would quickly drive them out of the 
bond market and into the blue bond-issuing Eurozone Stability Mechanism (ESM). Therefore, under the 
current proposal, in practice all sovereign bonds issued in the eurozone, regardless of ex-ante GDP 
limits, would have to be assumed to be blue bonds – an outcome that is fraught with moral hazard. 
Partial insurance of sovereign bonds by the ESM that avoids such ex-ante volume limitations is a more 
efficient alternative. Sovereign bonds would embed a predetermined percentage of junior debt that would 
be spun off as a marketable bond on the ESM application day, while the remaining senior debt would be 
amortised as scheduled. Such ‘junior’ bonds could be subject to a restructuring or haircut under an 
emergency fiscal adjustment programme devised by the ESM. The insured portion, the ‘senior’ bond, 
would stabilise investor balance sheets by setting a floor under sovereign bond prices – both ex-ante and 
ex-post. Additional debt to be issued by the sovereign during a financial crisis would remain partially 
insured and thus carry substantially lower marginal costs of capital than ‘red’ bonds. This would 
enhance the options for the borrower to adopt fiscal measures early and reduce the likelihood of tapping 
the ESM for primary market funds.  
Viewed from a political economy perspective, partial sovereign bond insurance is nothing more than a 
formalisation of what has already been agreed upon. This is the declared policy action of both banks and 
governments in the current crisis: private sector first-loss participation while avoiding a catastrophic 
(‘Lehman’) loss event. 
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De facto full insurance creates massive moral 
hazard  
Because red bonds cannot work in a stressful 
situation, the distinction between blue and red 
bonds is an artificial one. In reality, investors will 
anticipate the outcome during crisis and consider 
all bonds issued under the scheme as blue, i.e. fully 
protected by the ESM, with the red bonds being 
merely a contingent liability. 
This would eliminate market discipline almost 
entirely rather than defining a playing field for the 
market. 
Full insurance perceived by investors renders it 
more likely that other markets will be ‘pegged’ to 
the benefiting sovereign market via explicit or 
implicit sovereign guarantees, e.g. bank, mortgage 
(retail) and corporate bond markets.  
This eliminates market discipline in additional 
markets, where far greater options for private 
sector control exist than in the sovereign market, 
and at the same time raises potential bailout costs.  
The marginal cost of the funds problem described 
will become more acute, as the surpassing of a 
specific sovereign debt-to-GDP level becomes 
more likely when other bond markets are being 
simultaneously guaranteed and lose discipline. 
Necessary fiscal controls (joint fiscal policy) for a 
full insurance model are large, and short-term 
implementation is out of question in the eurozone, 
let alone the EU. Not even the US, which is far 
more advanced in fiscal (and political) integration 
than the eurozone, has a full insurance model in 
state finance. Fiscal coordination between states in 
the US is rather indirect, via copying of fiscal rules 
and transfer policy arrangements, and state debt is 
not explicitly guaranteed by the federal level.  
To support a full insurance model, a very large 
ESM, established as a quasi-bank, will be required, 
which may prove very hard to control in day-to-
day operations. 
It is finally worth noting that the financial situation 
that an unlimited blue bond would create is 
exactly the same as the eurozone situation of the 
2000s, when spreads of sovereign bonds to Bunds 
already were minimal. This caused substantial 
delay in addressing fundamental fiscal and 
economic problems, and even deterioration. 
Partial sovereign bond insurance by the 
eurozone (‘eurozone bond insurance’) 
Basic concept 
The fundamental alternative to full insurance with 
a non-credible volume limit is partial insurance 
without a volume limit. The goal is to moderate 
the marginal cost of funds in a crisis situation 
while keeping them sufficiently high in a non-
crisis situation, in order to keep incentives for 
sound fiscal and economic management intact and 
discourage the described pegging of other bond 
markets. 
Partial insurance could come in highly diverse 
forms, as a review of products in the existing bond 
insurance market shows. The particular form 
proposed here would be a partial insurance wrap 
of both principal and interest by the ESM. 
However, as a variant to standard partial wraps, 
we propose to endow the protected bond with a 
‘dormant’ senior-junior structure. Dormant means 
that a ‘junior’ bond – the principal/interest not 
protected by the ESM – is created if and when the 
bond insurance is called.  
The trigger date is when the ESM is tapped as the 
lender of last resort by the borrower. The entire 
yield curve of the borrower is treated equally. For 
non-maturing bonds, the call leads to the creation 
(split) of the (tradeable) junior bond and a senior 
bond to be serviced and amortised by the ESM as 
scheduled. Tradeable junior bonds serve to better 
manage the balance sheet risks of investors and 
attract additional investor classes interested in 
speculative assets. 
Junior bonds could be restructured (e.g. with 
payouts linked to GDP growth) or given a haircut 
under the fiscal adjustment programme to be 
determined between the ESM and the borrower. 
As with Eurobonds, ESM-sponsoring governments 
would be provided with ample control rights in 
return for their partial sovereign bond guarantees.3 
In particular, a set of fiscal (and financial sector) 
policy criteria – in addition to other signals, such 
as rating or spreads – could serve to specify and 
differentiate the necessary insurance premiums to 
fund the scheme.  
                                                            
3 Whether to continue to use the term ‘Eurobond’ for a 
partially ESM-insured sovereign bond is a matter of 
communication with the public. Much positioning against or 
in favour of Eurobonds has taken place in the European 
political sphere, with little reference to specifics. 4 | H
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average cost of funds for both proposals would 
be roughly the same. 
Ireland: As with Italy, the 60% ceiling was pierced 
with the banking crisis in the third quarter of 
2009. It is worth noting the vast marginal cost of 
funds’ advantage of the partial insurance solution 
of a full 400 bp, resulting from the massively 
widened sovereign spread. Red bonds would 
have been out of the question for Ireland, which 
has tapped the  European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF). Importantly, under the partial 
insurance concept, the critical threshold rate of 
7% would have been pierced only very late, in 
May 2011. Positive feedback effects of the partial 
insurance coverage might even have avoided 
drawing on the EFSF. 
Greece: Facing large debt levels, issuing red bonds 
in the Greek case would have been as non-
feasible as in the Irish case. We note also that the 
average cost of funds of the blue/red bond 
combination would have exceeded the partial 
insurance average cost of funds by some 100-
200bp, since debt levels are so high. Again, the 
marginal cost of funds of a partial insurance 
solution would have been far lower than red 
bond rates, and the critical 7% level would have 
been pierced far later. In the Greek case, my term 
structure assumptions (see footnote Error! 
Bookmark  not  defined.) appear particularly 
restrictive, as the sovereign had preferred long-
term bond issues that dampened the rise in the 
average cost of funds. In combination with partial 
insurance reducing the marginal cost of funds, 
this might have substantially increased the room 
for avoiding tapping the EFSF. 
General cost-benefit considerations  
•  Calibrated burden-sharing of investors in an ESM 
resolution. When a new partially insured bond 
is issued, it already entails an adequate 
structuring for the resolution case. The junior 
bond is split away on the rescue event date 
from the senior bond, e.g. at a ratio of 40-60%, 
as in the simulation. It only then becomes 
subordinated, to both the senior bonds it was 
split from, and all new bonds issued. 
Maturity, amortisation and interest rate 
conditions of the junior bond can be changed 
by the ESM in interaction with the borrower 
to support the fiscal adjustment programme. 
No separate agreement with creditors will be 
needed, even though the concept can be 
reconciled with the proposed collective action 
clauses for bonds issued from 2013 onwards.  
•  Adequate minimum protection of investors. The 
senior bond portion is amortised by the ESM 
under its contractual conditions without 
further conditionality (i.e. public 
discussion/political risk). This sets a floor 
under investor losses and safeguards an 
important volume of his liquidity needs. It is 
paramount to avoid another Argentina or 
Lehman event with bottomless senior bond 
prices and illiquid markets in them, in order 
to stabilise the bond market as a whole. 
Regulatory benefits for senior bonds would 
stabilise the capital situation of banks and 
insurance companies hit by an event. 
Regulatory capital differentiation would be 
focused on the junior bond, which those 
institutions can dispose of, but in exchange for 
a write-down.  
•  Freedom to dispose, beneficial speculation. The 
junior bond split from the senior bond on the 
rescue event date can be sold by the investor 
at the most convenient point in time, or kept 
to its restructured maturity. Credit funds and 
other risk-takers in the market will appreciate 
those bonds as convenient leveraged vehicles, 
requiring less funding, to take a position in 
the underlying credit event. The current 
‘mezzanine’ problem – a dry-up of 
institutional investor liquidity in the middle 
spread range where interest by credit funds is 
still low – is being avoided.  
•  Avoids triggering rating and credit default swap 
(CDS) default clauses. The junior bond split 
from the senior bond on the rescue event date 
will still be ‘performing’ at that point in time, 
as will be, in any event, the senior bond. Only 
upon later restructuring will rating or CDS 
events be triggered. This will reduce but not 
eliminate another financial accelerator. 
•  Minimisation of distortions across the sovereign 
yield curve and re-establishment of long-term 
investor trust. The current rescue operations 
via the EFSF are highly distortive since they 
subordinate later maturing long-term bonds 
to both short-term bonds and long-term bonds 
near their maturitydate. Such implicit 
subordination gets worse as more debt is 
amortised in full by the EFSF, implying – for PARTIAL SOVEREIGN BOND INSURANCE BY THE EUROZONE | 7 
 
budget constraint reasons – a declining 
likelihood that future amoritisations will be 
similarly made in full. This dynamics has 
already substantially contributed to the 
secondary-market widening seen during the 
current crisis, and worsened the crisis. Time 
subordination is also extremely dangerous, as 
it provides governments with incentives to 
shorten funding maturities going forward. 
Since junior bonds would be created over the 
entire yield curve on the rescue event day, 
there is no such risk under this partial 
insurance proposal. It brings back the priority 
of the legal rank principle (‘waterfall’) over 
the arbitrary de-facto ranking on the time 
scale (‘first come first serve’). This should help 
re-establish investor trust. 
•  Market control. The crisis has taught us that it 
is very important to differentiate the liability 
side of any large borrower to improve risk 
monitoring incentives and enable efficient 
burden-sharing. The proposed structure is just 
one instrument; others – such as contingent 
convertibles in the case of banks – are being 
discussed and partly already implemented. 
While a junior-senior split is the appropriate 
instrument for sovereigns, it can also be 
applied to banks. However, in the case of 
sovereign finance with fewer control options 
over balance sheets than in corporate finance, 
it would be crucial not to split senior and 
junior debt already upon their creation to 
keep risk monitoring incentives (or the desire 
to hedge in markets that will arise as a result 
of the structure) of senior bond-holders alive.  
•  Improvement of communication with the markets. 
The markets are highly sensitive to attempts 
at political manipulation. In contrast to the 
blue/red bond proposal, where the blue bond 
GDP limit would immediately come under 
fire when debt levels rise, under contractually 
determined partial insurance coverage, 
political determinations and designations 
would not come into play before the rescue 
event date, and even then would be limited to 
junior bonds. 
•  Fiscal cost. While initially a eurozone partial 
insurance scheme run by the ESM would need 
sizeable financial backstopping from higher-
rated sovereigns, the accumulation of cash 
reserves via charging insurance premiums 
would reduce this need over time. The EFSF 
already builds reserves in this way.6 The 
required reserves on an expected loss basis of 
a partial bond insurance scheme will depend 
on specific insurance conditions (coverage and 
premia), the probability of and loss-given 
default, and the sequencing adopted when 
phasing in the new bond market regime. We 
turn to some of these issues below; calibration 
requires a more detailed feasibility 
assessment.  
Partial bond insurance as a step-by-step 
formalisation of existing crisis response 
policies 
Bond insurance mechanisms in general and the 
construct of junior bonds in particular are neither 
rocket science nor new. They have been used 
extensively in corporate and sovereign 
restructurings, including in the Argentine case. 
Latin American Brady Bonds created a version of 
tradeable debt in the secondary market after 
restructuring akin to the tradeable junior bond 
proposed here.  
The constitution of the EFSF as a primary market 
lender of last resort is already one partial 
insurance model.  
The EFSF has so far been operated under great 
ambiguity regarding its financial conditions, with 
key conditions such as the degree of private 
sector participation, the level of interest rates and 
terms charged for fresh money being left 
unspecified until sufficient political pressure 
mounted. This situation is highly unsatisfactory, 
and as we advance towards defining the rules of 
the ESM, which substitutes the EFSF from 2013 
onwards, a more systematic solution is required.  
However, we already have two political 
agreements in the eurozone, which could form 
the basis for that solution: first, a minimum level 
of protection for existing bondholders, i.e. no 
                                                            
6 The large German sovereign bond investor Allianz (2011) 
has proposed to explicitly convert the EFSF into a European 
Sovereign Bond Insurance Mechanism. However, Allianz 
proposes de facto full insurance wraps along the lines of US 
monolines, with a deductible of 10% that would lead most 
insured bonds into AA territory. This would then be closer 
to the blue bond, giving rise to the same volume limitation 
debate as the unconstrained catastrophic risk protection 
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Lehman event in the range of 10% (10c/€) 
recovery ratio, in a large, systemically relevant 
debtor. Second, we have nevertheless agreed on 
substantial private sector (investor) participation. 
The initiative taken by the Fédération Bancaire 
Française in June 2011, for example, comes out on 
Greek existing debt at roughly 50% coverage 
(50c/€ minimum payout) – the equivalent of the 
proposed senior bond. 
The French banking industry initiative also 
highlights the options for the ESM to adopt 
different bond insurance payout variants: 30c/€ 
will be paid to participating lenders in cash, while 
approximately 20c/€ will be paid via highly rated 
zero coupon bonds. It was promptly followed by 
proportional additional write-downs across the 
European banking industry on Greek debt in July 
and August 2011. 
The crucial point is the precedent of the 
acceptance of a specific EFSF coverage ratio by a 
large investor class, namely banks. The step still 
to be taken from here to a systematic partial bond 
insurance model is to further specify and then 
either statutorily or contractually formalise that 
ratio. 
Responding to speculative attacks 
against a specific ESM partial insurance 
coverage ratio: Time variation of 
coverage or a structured defence system?  
George Soros, in his FT comment of 14 August 
2011, raised the point about the need for a rather 
high insurance coverage level by the eurozone 
initially, to instil market confidence amidst 
heightened investor anxiety.  
While little can be said against the tactical 
argument, there are also strong arguments from a 
structural perspective in favour of a more limited 
coverage, including the imperative to not 
compromise what the industry already has 
agreed upon, after a year of painful discussion, to 
shoulder as private-sector participation for 
Greece.  
A related question is whether there should be a 
time-constant or time-variable insurance coverage 
ratio, the first being de-facto a statutory figure, 
the latter contractual: using a constant figure 
matching long-term needs of the entire eurozone 
would have the great advantage of almost 
eliminating political risk, while a variable figure 
could be fine-tuned to the market situation. A 
constant figure would clearly require special 
protection in the ESM statutes. 
Clearly, the higher and more flexible the partial 
insurance coverage ratio, the greater the 
protection of weaker eurozone members will be 
against speculative attacks. However, also the 
higher and more flexible the partial insurance 
ratio, the greater the moral hazard and 
downgrade risk for the ESM.  
Partial insurance even at a constant ratio already 
goes a long way towards improving shock 
resilience even for weaker eurozone members, as 
the simulation shows. The developing defence 
system against speculative attacks should help to 
add the needed flexibility. To use a football 
analogy (pricing indications refer to fixed-rate 
bullet bonds with maturity of 10 years): the goal 
keeper stands where the secondary market 
playing field is limited, e.g. at 60c/€ as in the 
simulation. This is the ESM as lender of last resort 
in the primary bond market and partial bond 
insurer, as described. Defence line: the ESM and 
the ECB would both remain secondary bond 
market purchasers, playing at varying bond price 
levels, but not very far advanced. The danger of 
intervening early (as the ECB did in the Greek 
case at 80-90c/€) is to accumulate losses quickly 
and increase political resistance against an 
intervention mandate, while being ultimately 
unable to fend off the speculative attack. As for 
the defensive mid-field: we need fundamentally 
changed incentives for institutions to induce them 
to invest anti-cyclically, e.g. as borrower 
succumbs to fiscal adjustment programme. 
Currently, many institutions in the eurozone 
decide, and in some cases are even told by their 
regulators, to disinvest from periphery debt, 
rather than anti-cyclically invest when bond 
prices have dropped. This is despite substantial 
general regulatory privileges when investing in 
sovereign bonds and their implicit backing by 
governments. The breakdown of the mid-field 
unduly increases pressure on the defence – the 
ESM and ECB to gain in scale (investment 
volumes) and strength (rating). In the offensive 
mid-field: banks, which hold bonds for both 
investment and speculation purposes, appear 
hobbled by undercapitalisation and the 
regulatory attack against proprietary trading. A 
number of questions, ranging from accounting to 
capital requirements, need to be resolved to bring PARTIAL SOVEREIGN BOND INSURANCE BY THE EUROZONE | 9 
 
them back into the market. However, it is 
noteworthy that in Europe many banks have a 
rather institutional investor character as long-
term investors in sovereign bonds, and a revision 
of incentives to invest here should have a similar 
defensive impact, as in the case of institutions. 
Phasing-in 
Should only new bonds be enrolled in the partial 
eurozone bond insurance scheme or both existing 
and new bonds?  
In favour of new bonds: In the absence of a clear 
and in particular credible ranking (see above), the 
insurance mechanism could be focused on 
attracting and giving preference to fresh money 
in a crisis situation. This would reduce the 
burden on the ESM on the primary lending side, 
while splitting the primary and secondary market 
and increasing the probability of secondary 
market sell-offs. 
In favour of both existing and new bonds: Enrolling 
all bonds from day one would immediately 
stabilise intermediary balance sheets. However, it 
is potentially more costly and could create 
adverse incentives. The better route could be the 
direct stabilisation of balance sheets (e.g. bank 
recapitalisation). 
The call to be made here depends greatly on the 
scale of the feedback effects between primary and 
secondary markets. Given that the thrust of the 
partial bond insurance proposal is to truly attack 
a large problem (dwindling confidence in the 
eurozone), to minimise pricing distortions 
between primary and secondary market 
segments, and to formalise decisions already 
made on existing bond portfolios (private sector 
participation in the Greek case), a comprehensive 
solution is preferable, i.e. the enrolment of 
existing and new bonds. This has substantial 
implications for the size of the EFSF, however, 
and later on for the ESM. To establish credibility, 
it will be more important to mobilise the entire 
defence system described above. 
A number of open questions 
There are certainly numerous open questions 
with a partial bond insurance regime, in 
particular if it is integrated into a staggered 
defence structure, as described. 
•  Adverse selection/scope: Should governments 
that would, temporarily or permanently, not 
benefit from partial eurozone bond insurance 
be forced to enrol their bonds? Should bond 
market sectors that are government-
sponsored be enrolled or only implicitly 
backed? Clearly, the broader the scope, the 
lower the probability that isolated bond 
market crises will turn into a general crisis of 
confidence. Yet, the broader the scope, the 
higher the explicit capital needs of the 
insurance. 
•  Pricing: On what historical database and from 
what time onwards should catastrophic risk 
protection as described be priced for the 
individual sovereign? Catastrophic risk 
pricing would implicitly set a floor under 
interest rates when the most immediate need 
is setting a cap. This begs the question of the 
timing of its introduction. 
•  Intervention rights: When fiscal adjustment 
needs to start prior to ESM primary market 
application (e.g. in the case of buying Italian 
or Spanish debt), the question of automatic 
triggers for adjustment arises. 
•  Seniority of primary market funds: Even though 
public claims must not be senior to private 
claims per se (as numerous historical 
examples show, e.g. the German financial 
crisis of 1929-30, in which foreign public 
claims were senior), the seniority of fresh 
financial commitments over existing debt 
must be observed – regardless of the identity 
of the investor. The eurozone made a contrary 
predisposition in June 2011: ESM funds rank 
pari passu with existing investors, and below 
new private investors. This can only weaken 
ESM intervention capacity and should be 
repealed. 
•  ESM size and protection: To the extent that the 
mid-field in the defence system of a partial 
insurance scheme – banks and institutions – 
remains non-operational, even in cases 
deemed to suffer primarily from illiquidity 
rather than from serious insolvency risk, the 
ECB and the ESM in particular must have 
greater room for purchases. This might call for 
automatic capitalisation mechanisms beyond 
insurance premia collected and sponsor 
guarantees given (such as potentially ring-
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capital for the ESM), possibly also for bank 
rather than agency charter (allowing for repo 
operations).7 
Conclusion 
There have been many attempts to solve the 
eurozone crisis, most of which have failed 
miserably. The discussants of the existing regime 
and the Bruegel plan are aware of all the options 
and their drawbacks.  
None of the options in bond instrument design – 
neither the blue/red bond proposal nor the 
partial insurance proposal – offers a miracle 
solution: once over-indebtedness is a fact, some 
investors are going to take a loss. Once financial 
crisis has reached the systemic risk stage, stronger 
governments are needed to support weaker ones, 
and bold institutional and instrument design 
steps need to be taken.  
However, a partial bond insurance scheme such 
as the one proposed here, in particular if 
combined with a structured defence system 
against speculative attacks, can help to improve 
communications between the market and 
government via a proven, credible and 
transparent concept; minimise market distortions 
by treating all bondholders equally; contain 
supra-national protection costs; operate anti-
cyclically rather than pro-cyclically; give the 
investor greater freedom to operate both ex-ante 
and ex-post, and keep the real causes of market 
volatility better tied to the credit fundamentals. 
 
                                                            
7 See Mayer & Gros (2011). 
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